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Abstract - With a rapid growth in computer networks, 
many people can access the network through the 
Internet and therefore an electronic voting can be a 
viable alternative for conducting an election.  
Electronic voting system must attempt to achieve at 
least the same level of security as ordinary elections.   
We have developed an electronic voting system, 
E-Voting for a general election. E-Voting system 
employs cryptographic techniques to overcome the 
security issues in the election process.  In this system, 
voter’s privacy is guaranteed by using a blind 
signature for confidentiality and voter’s digital 
signature for voter’s authentication.  
E-Voting is implemented by employing Java 
socket technology and BouncyCastle cryptography 
provider.  The provider, which is an open source 
library, is used to provide the secure communication 
channel. The voter’s private key for digital signature 
is protected by using password-based encryption with 
SHA and Twofish-CBC algorithm so that only valid 




Election is a fundamental instrument of 
democracy that provides an official mechanism for 
people to express their views to the government. 
Traditionally, the process of voting is quite 
cumbersome because voter must come in person to 
vote. This problem results in the low participation rate 
of voting. Vote-by-mail can cater for certain voters 
such as those who live in sparsely populated areas and 
who work far away from the voting centers.  
However, this method is time-consuming and 
cumbersome for the authority to manage since it 
requires extra work to send, collect and count the 
ballots manually [1]. Electronic voting system or EVS 
can overcome those problems. EVS is expected to 
make our modern social life more convenient, 
efficient and inexpensive.   By using EVS in national 
election, a voter can vote from his home or office.  
EVS must meet security requirments such as 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and 
verifiability. This is because EVS is more vulnerable 
than traditional voting due to the nature of digital 
processing of election data which can be easily 
manipulated, hence may result in widespread fraud 
and corruption [1,2].   
In this research, we have implemented a 
prototype of an EVS, called E-Voting, that satisfies 
four security requirements for a safe election. This is 
achieved by designing some protocols that guarantee 
those requirements. We believe that E-Voting can 
reduce human error in voting process by providing 
easy-to-use user interface.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, security requirements for an EVS are 
reviewed. Security mechanisms employed in E-
Voting are discussed in Section 3. In section 4, we 
discuss the general architecture of our system and 
explain the protocols in each voting stage. In section 
5, the implementation of the system is discussed. 
Finally, concluding remark will follow in Section 6. 
 
2. Security Requirements 
 
Many extensive researches on electronic voting 
have been conducted and therefore there are now an 
extensive list of security requirements available. 
Without these security requirements, numerous 
opportunities for a widespread fraud and corruption 
may exist. In order to overcome these problems, an 
election should have the following requirements [3, 
4]: 
 
(i) Confidentiality  
(ii) Integrity  
(iii) Authentication 
(iv) Verifiability  
 
2.1 Confidentiality 
The voter’s ballot should be kept confidential. In 
addition, a voting protocol must not allow any voter 
to prove that he or she voted in a particular way.  This 




In electronic voting, there is no physical ballot.  
The digital ballot can be tampered with ease, given 
the insecure nature of current computer networks.  
Hence, with digital ballot system, the integrity of 
receipt by the computer of the voter’s choice is a great 
issue.  The published results should measure how the 
eligible voters actually vote.  To achieve the integrity 
of the EVS, the protocol must ensure only valid votes 
are counted in the final tally and no one can change 
anyone else’s vote without being discovered. 
2.3 Authentication 
During voting, EVS must provide an 
authentication mechanism that ensures a voter who is 
allowed to vote must be an eligible voter and he is a 
person he claims to be. Therefore during registration, 
some form of credential or ticket must be given to a 
voter so that it can be used to authenticate him during 
voting.  Another issue that must be considered here is 
that the notion of one-person one vote must be 
preserved. So, EVS must provide a mechanism to 
check this notion.  
 
2.4 Verifiability 
Verifiability can be categorized into two: 
individual and universal verifiability.  Individual 
verifiability means a voter can check that his vote was 
properly received and has been taken into account in 
the final tally. While a universal verifiability means 
anyone can verify at a later time that the election was 
properly performed [5]. Universal verifiability allows 
auditing by the public and therefore anyone can verify 
that all votes have been counted correctly. In EVS, to 
achieve verifiability, the results and the collected 
ballots are published for public viewing.  
 
3. Security Mechanisms in E-Voting 
 
In this research, we developed an EVS, E-Voting, 
which applies security mechanisms in order to 
achieve the four security requirements needed for any 
election process.  In this system, voter’s privacy is 
guaranteed by using a blind signature for 
confidentiality and voter’s digital signature for voter’s 
authentication.   
 
3.1 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is used to authenticate that the 
message comes from a particular sender.  This is done 
by attaching a code that acts as a signature.  This 
signature guarantees the source and the integrity of 
the message [6]. 
E-Voting employs RSA encryption. RSA is the 
first public-key encryption algorithm, and is widely 
considered the best to date [7]. It is an asymmetric 
cipher, utilizing two different keys, the public and the 
private, to perform encryption and decryption.  The 
key pair is generated as follows: two prime numbers, 
p & q are generated and multiplied together to get the 
modulus, n. (p-1) is multiplied by (q-1) to get Φ (n).  
The public exponent, e which is less than and 
relatively prime to Φ (n) is chosen. Private exponent, 
d is calculated using the formula, d = e-1 mod Φ (n). 
The public key is {n,e} and the private key is {n,d}.  
The equation for encryption and decryption are as 
follows: 
Encryption: C = Me mod n 
Decryption: M = Cd mod n 
In E-Voting, digital signature is created by using 
RSA encryption. The process begins with the hashing 
of the  message, M,  to produce a message digest, H. 
The digest is then encrypted using the sender’s private 
key {n,d} to produce the signature, S. 
S = Hd mod n 
To verify the message, the receiver  will hash the 
message, M by using the same digest function. At the 
same time, the signature, S is decrypted using the 
receiver’s public key.  
  H = Se mod n 
The results of the two processes are  then 
compared. If they are equal then the message is 
authenticated and the integrity of the message is 
maintained. 
 
3.2 Blind Signature 
A blind signature is similar to a digital signature 
except that it allows a person to get another person to 
sign a message without revealing the content of a 
message. It is the most popular cryptographic 
technique in EVS by providing confidentiality of the 
voter’s ballot [4][5][8][9]. The signature is used to 
authenticate the voter without disclosing the content 
of a ballot. Hence the authority whose function is to 
verify the eligibility of a voter will not know whom a 
voter votes for.  
In E-Voting, a ballot is blinded in order to 
achieve its confidentiality requirement.  A voter is 
required to get the signature of a validator when he 
votes.  To ensure the secrecy of his ballot, a voter 
casts a ballot, B, blinds a ballot using a random 
number and sends it to the validator.  Let (n,e) be the 
validator’s public key and (n,d) be his private key. A 
voter generates a random number r such that gcd(r,n) 
= 1 and sends the following to the validator: 
B’ = re B mod n. 
The random number r conceals the ballot from the 
validator. The validator then signs the blinded ballot 
after verifying the voter. The signed value is as 
follows: 
S’ = (B’)d = r B d mod n 
After receiving the validated ballot, the voter unblinds 
the ballot, to get the true signature, S of the validator 
for the ballot, by computing, 
S = S’ r-1  mod n= B d
 
3.3 Other Cryptographic Schemes  
Two other cryptographic schemes employed in E-
Voting  are Diffie-Hellman key exchange and 
password-based encryption (PBE). The key exchange 
enables two users to exchange a key securely that can 
then be used for subsequent encryption of messages. 
It provides a method to create a shared secret key by 
exchanging public keys. Two users, who want to 
communicate, must have global public elements: 
prime number p and base g.  User A generates key XA 
by selecting a number less than p.  Its public key, YA 
is calculated using a formula: gXA mod g. User B also 
does the same thing producing its private key XB and 
public key YB.  Each side sends their public keys to 
each other. Then each side does the key agreement 
process. For User A, it generates the secret key, K 
using the formula (YB)XA mod q. For user B, the same 
secret K is generated by (YA)XB mod q. 
The RSA private key is too long for people to 
remember. Therefore it is normally stored in a 
medium like diskette or smart card. To preserve its 
confidentiality, the key need to be encrypted. E-
Voting encrypts the private key with a user password. 
The password is hashed using a message digest 
algorithm, SHA-1 and the resulting digest is used to 
construct a binary key for Twofish-CBC. A salt, 
random number, is added to the algorithm to make 
the key difficult to break [7].  
The private key, salt and user password are 
passed to the PBE cipher to produce a cipher text, C. 
The salt and the cipher text are combined together, 
{salt, C}. 
When user wants to retrieve the private key, user 
must provide the password. The cipher text, C, the 
salt and the password are passed to the cipher to 
produce back the private key. 
 
 
4. E-Voting System Architecture 
 
In this section, we describe the overall 
architecture and the voting stages of E-Voting system. 
Figure 1 illustrates E-Voting architecture. It consist of 
seven basic entities: voter, administrator, tallier, 
validator, registrar, E-Voting database and national 
registration database. In E-Voting, only a registered 
voter can vote, register himself as a candidate or 
becomes a nominator. 
Administrator of E-Voting is responsible in 
setting the dates of registration and voting. Besides 
that, administrator registers voter to become a 
candidate. A Validator is responsible to validate the 
ballot sent by voters during voting. He also verifies 
the eligibility of the voter and produce the ballot id 
and the list of candidates to vote. At the end of voting 
period, Tallier will count the ballots. During voting, 
Tallier verifies the ballot sent by voter. 
These multi-authority voting system can 
overcome problems like phantom voters, casting a 
vote for abstaining voters, registered voters cast more 
than once or the ballots miscounting [1]. 
 
4.1 Election Stages 
There are four stages in E-Voting. They are Voter 
Registration, Candidate Registration, Voting and 
Counting. The following sections will descibe the 
protocols and events in each of the four stages. Prior 
to these stages, all entities key pairs except for voters 
should be generated. 
 
4.1.1 Voter Registration 
In any election, an individual must register to be 
an elligible voter.  This is done before the voting 
































Figure 1: E-Voting 
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a valid voter, Validator will obtain the precinct 
number of the voter and send him the ballot.  
Each ballot has a unique id. 
iii. The voter casts his ballot and the ballot is then 
blinded, signed, encrypted and sent to the 
Validator to be validated. 
iv. Validator signed the blinded ballot after verifying 
the voter. The signed blinded ballot is sent back 
to the voter. 
v. Voter checks the integrity of the ballot by 
unblinding the validated ballot and compare it 
with the original one. 
vi. The validated ballot and the original ballot are 
sent to the tallier. The communication is 
protected by a session key (BlowFish) that has 
been agreed when the connection is set up. 
vii.  The Tallier checks the validity of the ballot using 
Validator’s public key. The validated ballot is 
stored in the E-Voting database. 
viii. Tallier acknowledges voter by sending the ballot 
id, time and date of voting and is signed with 
Tallier’s private key, td. 
      
4.1.4 Counting Protocol 
When voting period is over, Tallier will 
automatically count the ballot and determine the 
counts for each candidate and  save it in the database. 
The result is verified by the election authority before 




In order to implement this E-Voting system 
efficiently, we use JBuilder5 program. This program 
could speed up the development of this system 
because it has facilities to draw forms and to add 
library easily. 
 
5.1 Cryptographic Library 
The E-Voting system is developed using Java 
language version jdk1.3.1_01. In addition, Java 
Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and Java 
Cryptography Extension (JCE) are also being used in 
providing cryptographic functions to all the E-Voting 
components. JCE is not provided by default in 
jdk1.3.1_01, therefore JCE must be downloaded. Two 
advantages of using JCA and JCE are that the 
encryption functions need not to be redeveloped and 
the applications will be portable to different 
environments using Java libraries. BouncyCastle JCE 
provider is chosen because it is licensed as open 
source and the most complete cryptographic provider 
[7].  
During voter registration, secure communication 
between voter and registrar is achieved by encrypting 
data sent using a session key. The session key is 
created using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
algorithm. The main issue of using this algorithm is 
the way to choose global parameter. Both parties must 
have the same global parameter. Therefore, we use a 
standard for that modulus and base, known as SKIP 
(the Simple Key management for Internet Protocols). 
SKIP has established values for 512, 1024, and 2048-
bit keys. 1024-bit SKIP spec is chosen for E-Voting.  
 
5.2 Servers 
Server with large memories and high speed 
processor is recommended. This is because the server 
may run a large number of threads to service large 
numbers of voters at one time.  
 
5.3 Network Connection 
The E-Voting system is based on a client-server 
model and it has been implemented using socket-
based communication. Socket-based communication 
enables applications to view networking as if it were 
file I/O, whereby a program can read from a socket or 
write to a socket as simple as reading from a file or 
writing to a file. Java provides socket-based 
programming through classes in package java.net. 
Stream socket, which use Transport Control Protocol 
(TCP) is chosen to provide communication channel 
between client and server application. TCP protocol 
offers connection-oriented service, which ensures 
reliable data delivery [10]. 
 
5.4 Programs 
The are seven application programs developed to 
form the whole system. The server programs 
represent the server entities: Registrar, Administrator, 
Validator and Tallier. Respectively, the server 
programs are RegistrarServerApplication, 
AdministratorServerApplication, 
ValidatorServerApplication and 
TallierServerApplication. Client applications are 
Voting, VoterRegistration and CandidateRegistration. 
A web site is developed to allow voter to see the 
election result and check their ballots for verification. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
 
We have implemented a system prototype that 
implements security protocols that meet the security 
requirements of an EVS. With this system, electronic 
ballots are generated automatically. The participation 
rate of voting is expected to increase because voters 
do not have to line-up in a long queue anymore. With 
electronic ballots, results can be obtained faster than 
the traditional voting. Besides that, it satisfies the 
universal verifiability since the public can verify the 
election results.  
Below are improvements that can be made on the 
system: 
a) E-Voting requires users to download and install 
the client application. It will be easy for computer 
literate users but will incur difficulty for those 
who are not. This can be overcome by 
implementing web-based voting.  In order to do 
these, applets will be used to implement the 
security part of the system. Applet is a 
downloadable program code and can be executed 
in a voter’s web browser which supports Java.  
Therefore a voter and a candidate do not need to 
download any code ahead of time and install it in 
their client computers. 
b) The system developed employs public-key 
cryptosystem.  When a key-pair is generated for a 
voter during registration, the public-key is kept in 
a database while a private-key is stored in a 
diskette provided by a user.  Instead of using a 
diskette, smart card technology can be employed 
to do this.  It is also possible to enhance the work 
by incorporating E-Voting with public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) which provides a means to 
verify that a public-key belongs to a specific 
voter.   
c) Security of the system can be greatly improved if 
biometric authentication system such as 
fingerprint or face is employed. However, this 
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